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Agonistic Moralism
  Mark Silcox 
Abstract
Many otherwise admired authors in the Western tradition (e.g. Plato,
Augustine, and Tolstoy) have defended views about the radical
dependence of aesthetic value upon morality that are nowadays
regarded with deep skepticism. In more recent work on the connection
between moral and aesthetic properties, Noël Carroll, Anne Eaton, Berys
Gaut, and others have tried to defend relatively moderate varieties of
moralism about art, according to which the aesthetic value of ethically
significant artworks sometimes overlaps with but might also
independently vary from their moral status. Here, I develop an
immoderate species of moralism that treats the type of ethical knowledge
inculcated by good art as a species of quasi-competitive skill rather than
an outcome of perception or inference. Such a view, I argue, avoids
some of the weaknesses that have made earlier philosophers' claims
about the moral significance of art seem excessively puritanical to
contemporary sensibilities.
Key Words
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1. Introduction
Malcolm Bradbury's 1975 novel, The History Man, is a lucidly pessimistic
satire of British academic life. Its protagonist, Howard Kirk, teaches
sociology at a provincial university, emitting a steady stream of self-
serving, political bombast in the classroom, while neglecting his wife,
persecuting his colleagues, and seducing his most vulnerable students.
In the context of lauding the work as one of the best British novels of the
late twentieth century, Anthony Burgess describes Howard as a
"detestable character." But he also remarks that the story's "great
aesthetic virtue" is its
total objectivity. No judgement is forced, we make up our
own minds. There will be readers capable of seeing
Howard Kirk as a personification of all the modern
virtues.[1]
There is something fishy going on here. Burgess surely wouldn't have
bothered to register his detestation of Howard unless he thought that it
was, in some important way, correct to view the character as a
nogoodnik. But at the same time, he wants to praise Bradbury for not
inducing this very opinion in readers.
If Burgess is correct in his implicit suggestion that, despite the novel's
objectivity, it succeeds to the extent that one is able to find reasons to
find Howard contemptible, this will provide some support for what is
usually referred to in philosophical aesthetics as moralism: the thesis,
that is, that the ethical content of artworks is germane to our evaluation
of them as art, or, to put it a slightly different way, that there is a
significant overlap between moral and aesthetic value. In the recent
literature, this view is usually contrasted with autonomism, the view that
"art is a strictly autonomous realm of practice," or the closely related view
that aesthetic and moral value vary from one another independently.[2]
I shall not be directly concerned here with defending aesthetic moralism
against autonomism. Instead, I want to focus on the curious ways in
which some contemporary aestheticians have tried to qualify or mitigate
their endorsement of the former. I shall argue that the key to Bradbury's
artistic success and to that of many other ethically significant artworks,
in a diverse range of genres and media, is the way that they set a
specific kind of challenge for the reader, the overcoming of which
generates a distinctive variety of ethically salient skill-knowledge.
Somewhat ironically, it has been the failure of philosophers to recognize
the moral threat that so much good art presents us with that has led
them to make ultimately implausible exceptions to the general principle
that aesthetic value is a subspecies of moral value. But I shall try to
demonstrate that, once one appreciates the fundamentally agonistic
orientation of mind that ethically significant art requires of its audiences,
one has grounds to be significantly more immoderate and unqualified in
one's moralism. The value of such art is always to some extent
dependent upon the effectiveness by which it provokes audiences to
develop a keener capacity for distinguishing between what is genuinely
ethically admirable and what might be attractive to them for other
reasons.
Such an attitude toward the relationship between art and morality has
had plenty of eloquent supporters throughout the history of aesthetics,
from Plato and Augustine to Leo Tolstoy and Roger Taylor. But
philosophers in this longstanding tradition have usually defended
uncomfortably monistic conceptions of morality that are these days
widely perceived as undermining the plausibility of their views about
aesthetic value. Although I shall not offer anything like a full defense of
so-called radical moralism in the philosophy of art, I shall suggest that
the more objectionable aspects of such a view can be mitigated to the
extent that one acknowledges a greater separation between the form
and the content of morality, as it is effectuated by the consumption of
artworks.
Most of the specific examples discussed will be works of narrative
literature, but I shall conclude with a few very brief and tentative
suggestions about how the style of agonistic moralism that I defend
might have broader application in philosophical aesthetics.
2. What we don't learn from rough heroes
A lot of the most intense skepticism about moralism arises from the
suspicion that its defenders conceive of the value of art entirely in terms
of its capacity to impart edifying doctrine. This is an entirely just
complaint against some earlier proponents, such as Plato and Tolstoy.
But the thesis, as it has been defended more recently, has a lot less to
do with affording any sort of privileged status to overtly didactic art and is
for this reason susceptible to much more interesting variation.
In her influential 2012 paper, "Robust Immoralism," A.W. Eaton makes
some fascinating observations about the class of narrative artworks that
represent particularly morally distasteful characters to their audiences in
ways that she thinks are both ethically and aesthetically significant.
Eaton unequivocally endorses the basic intuition that artworks qua
artworks are "candidates for moral assessment."[3] She agrees with
orthodox moralists, such as Noël Carroll, that, when a story adopts a
perspective that prompts us to applaud acts of racially-motivated
violence, say, or the sexual conquests of a fictional child molester, there
are likely to be good reasons to change one's opinion of its aesthetic
merits on account of this fact. But she also suggests that some artworks
can have a greater aesthetic value than they would otherwise possess
by virtue of adopting immoral perspectives upon the characters they
depict.
The examples that she provides to support this claim are narratives that
depict the actions of "rough heroes," a term she borrows from David
Hume. Fictional protagonists such as Milton's Satan, Tony Soprano, and
Humbert Humbert appeal to us not just in spite of their ethical flaws but
to a large extent because of them. These characters, Eaton claims, are
different from mere antiheroes -Don Quixotes, Becky Sharps (Vanity
Fair), and Tyler Durdens (Fight Club)- because we view the sympathetic
features of the latter as exculpatory. The spectacle of Don Quixote's
courage and vigor prompts us to forgive his stubbornly delusive
arrogance. But Satan's charisma and stoic resoluteness in Paradise Lost
are far from sufficient excuses for his misotheism or his gratuitous
malice. Eaton suggests that the unresolved tension we experience when
confronted by the virtues and vices of rough heroes makes it especially
difficult to glean any positive moral lesson from the works that prompt us
to admire such characters.
A number of other contemporary philosophers have tried to explain the
effects of such artworks via an approach that Eaton dubs "cognitive
immoralism." Matthew Kieran, the most straightforward defender of this
type of view, claims that what makes immoral artworks valuable is the
way in which they "deepen our understanding."[4] Such works can, he
thinks, provide us with otherwise unobtainable insight into esoteric forms
of human motivation.[5] Noël Carroll makes the similar proposal that
works with rough heroes only elicit sympathy for evil characters for "the
purpose of ultimately inviting us to reflect upon our own moral weakness,
a moral purpose if there ever was one."[6] And in his influential 1997
paper, "In Praise of Immoral Art," Dan Jacobson remarks that
"evaluative discourse in a pluralistic society" requires us to "see the
world as…others do," even when their perspectives prove to be
systematically distorted. Immoral art, Jacobson suggests, might provide
us with the only way to do this from something other than a "wholly
external position."[7]
In opposition to these upbeat prognostications, Eaton very sensibly
protests that treating the value of such works as though it were always
intrinsically connected to the edification of audiences "saps immoral art
of its threat and menace."[8] Just as any real life act of violence or
degradation can be extrinsically beneficial if the whims of fate are kind -
recall familiar thought experiments about Hitler being strangled in his
crib - so any narrative artwork that does not destroy us might
conceivably make us mentally stronger, perhaps in an otherwise
unattainable way, even though it adopts an unambiguously immoral
perspective upon the characters it portrays. But it by no means follows
from this that deriving such epistemic benefits is a necessary condition
for appreciating the relevant works as art.
When it comes to describing what it is about narratives depicting rough
heroes that makes their specific type of ethical toxicity aesthetically
praiseworthy, however, Eaton's remarks are somewhat elliptical. First,
she says,
the rough hero type sets up and then skillfully solves an
ambitious and artistically interesting problem...The target
audience is one who would be strongly reluctant to direct
evaluatively positive affective states toward a morally
undeserving character...The challenge that works with
rough heroes set themselves, then, is to overcome this
substantial imaginative resistance and make the
audience feel something that it resists feeling on moral
grounds.[9]
These remarks are intriguing and suggestive as far as they go. But it is
surely also clear that, while there is always the possibility of some
overlap between other types of value and the aesthetic, not every type of
problem-solving is aesthetically significant. We tend to admire devious
crossword puzzles and fuel-efficient cars for different reasons than we
admire the works of poets, painters, and novelists. For Eaton, the
aesthetic problems solved by artworks with rough heroes are distinctive
insofar as these works bring about some state of internal conflict or
tension in their audiences that they would otherwise be relatively
unlikely to undergo. But why is this enough, by itself, to endow such
works with distinctively aesthetic rather than, say, merely therapeutic or
hedonic value?
Eaton is aware of this lacuna. "We do not just evaluate works based on
whether they solve their problems," she observes, "we evaluate the
problem itself." Questions she thinks we should ask include the
following: "Is it an interesting problem? Does it constitute a genuine
challenge? Is it a problem worth solving?"[10] While a "yes" answer to
any of these questions would certainly indicate that the work had some
kind of value, she leaves it unclear exactly how they are all supposed to
add up to a recipe for specifically aesthetic value.
Can such criteria be provided? Probably not in an entirely decisive way,
at least not without also developing a more general account of the nature
of the aesthetic, a task that far exceeds my ambitions here. What I shall
attempt to do instead is rely upon a mostly unexamined, rough-and-
ready understanding of the distinction between artworks and other
potential objects of appreciation (e.g. police reports, political slogans,
and religious dogmas) in order to describe how the competent
appreciation of just any work of art might be viewed as involving a single
discrete, albeit very general, type of problem-solving activity, one that
furthermore plays a constitutive role in human moral development. By
taking this approach, I shall remain agnostic on the question of whether
this sort of activity might be involved in all forms of aesthetic experience
or just the type that we associate specifically with the appreciation of
artworks.[11]
Before I expand upon this hypothesis about the role played by good art
in moral development, however, it will prove useful to reflect a bit more
carefully about exactly what conceptions of morality are in the offing
when philosophers discuss its connection with aesthetic value.
3. A plea for broadness
In Art, Emotion, and Ethics, Berys Gaut refers to himself as an 'ethicist'
rather than a moralist about art, at least partly because he wants his
own belief in the connection between aesthetic and moral value to seem
less qualified than those defended by Carroll and Eaton.[12] But he also
distinguishes between "overall" and "pro tanto" versions of ethicism and
only endorses the latter. To be an ethicist, as Gaut uses the term, is to
believe that whenever an artwork has positive or negative moral value in
an aesthetically relevant way it always also possesses the corresponding
valence of aesthetic value. But this very general principle must be
interpreted as merely pro tanto because some artworks might only be
susceptible to ethical improvement at the expense of what makes them
successful aesthetically.[13] In Camus' L’Etranger, for example, the
protagonist, Meursault, is casually racist in a way that the novel
somewhat culpably never treats as problematic. But if Meursault's inner
life were presented more hygienically, the novel would be a less
powerful and revealing depiction of a truly alien psychology. Likewise,
Lars Von Trier's film Dogville would lose its vital political subtext if the
otherwise sympathetic protagonist, Grace, chose to forgive the
inhabitants of the village that held her captive rather than having them
slaughtered. And Nabokov's Lolita would be barely recognizable if it
were never intimated that Lolita and Humbert had sex.[14]
Gaut elaborates upon his position by drawing a distinction between what
he calls "broad" and "narrower" conceptions of the ethical. According to
the former, "any good or bad aspect[s] of character," from sincerity and
patience to the ability to write well, may be characterized as ethical
qualities. The problem with adopting this view in the context of debates
about aesthetics, Gaut suggests, is that it would "afford an easy, though
entirely trivial, victory for ethical criticism."[15] For, according to Gaut, it
is surely beyond dispute that one has accomplished at least something
good when one has managed to correctly discern a work's aesthetic
value. Aestheticians should therefore confine themselves to a more
narrow or restrictive conception of the ethical, according to which its
content is strictly limited to "the kinds of motivations and feelings" that
"we have toward other people."[16] Gaut also denies that ethical
judgments, considered narrowly, possess any claim to
overridingness.[17] The question of whether we should, "all things
considered," act upon our specifically ethical obligations should always
be viewed within the context of aesthetics as "a non-trivial query."[18]
Gaut's suggestion that the ability to recognize aesthetic value always
represents the manifestation of some admirable character trait or other
is dubious at best. Why mightn't this ability often, perhaps even always,
be merely a desirable side-effect of some broader disposition that is, in
itself, unequivocally malign? An awareness of this dim but disturbing
possibility is surely part of the reason why many are so horrified when
they hear about Nazi officers weeping at Schubert recitals. Gaut also
acknowledges that regarding the scope of the ethical as limited to
specifically other-regarding obligations represents a distinctively modern
perspective upon the nature of morality. But many philosophers of the
past half-century have, in fact, endorsed the view that ethics is only
distinguishable from other forms of philosophical enquiry to the extent
that it addresses the utterly self-regarding question, "How should I
live?"[19]
As for Gaut's insistence upon the non-overridingness of moral
judgments, while this view derives some surface plausibility from the fact
that almost any grammatically well-formed question can be made to look
non-trivial from a sufficiently esoteric point of view, I also suspect that
most speakers of ordinary English would be pretty flummoxed if they
were asked whether one really should do something that was
uncontroversially required by morality. Such intuitions might perhaps be
less robust if the judgment were being made about a fictional character's
obligations rather than one's own. But this latter fact does not, by itself,
seem to provide any special reason for thinking of these topics more
narrowly in philosophical aesthetics than anywhere else.
To the extent that one is prepared to countenance a broader conception
of morality in aesthetics than Gaut allows for, can one also defend a
more robust (but still non-trivial) version of moralism? In what follows I
shall provide a brief outline of just such an immoderate species of
moralism and try to anticipate a few of the most serious objections that
could be brought against it. Its ultimate plausibility, I shall argue,
depends upon the extent to which aesthetic appreciation can be
understood as a fundamentally agonistic orientation toward the specific
type of psychological challenge that is presented to us by ethically
significant art.
4. Aesthetic appreciation and ethical knowledge
It is supremely unlikely that consumers of art will learn the truth of
principles such as "murder is bad" or "intellectual honesty requires self-
sacrifice" as the result of their aesthetic experiences, even when the
artworks under scrutiny may be taken to implicitly endorse these claims.
Such moral knowledge simply does not appear to come to us fresh via
the medium of art. As Noël Carroll observes, the belief that murder is
bad is something more like "a presupposition that the reader must bring
to Crime and Punishment in order to understand it." Carroll tries to
defend the idea that some works may have a more limited role to play in
moral education by teaching their audiences "how to apply…precepts to
situations."[20] But even this view of the ethical content of art is difficult
to sustain when one considers how few of the situations depicted in
works like Dostoyevsky's novel are likely to bear a sufficiently close
similarity to real events in the lives of their readers. Coming to
understand how one should best proceed upon being tempted to kill
one's pawnbroker with an axe does not seem to have the sort of direct
practical applicability that we associate with genuine ethical knowledge.
But the broader character-based conception of ethics that Gaut thinks
aestheticians would be better off ignoring has traditionally been
associated with an understanding of ethical knowledge that emphasizes
its similarity to perception over its derivability from highly abstract
principles, such as the Categorical Imperative or the Principle of Utility.
As Aristotle famously put it, the discovery of the most basic goods is like
"the knowledge whether this is a loaf [of bread] or is cooked the right
amount;" it is too tied to specific situations to be the outcome of a self-
consciously inferential process.[21]
Consider the following example of a situation of everyday moral
deliberation. A teenager hired as a babysitter is watching television and
working on homework when, at about the same time, the telephone
starts ringing and the toddler in the next room starts frantically
screaming. At this moment, the teenager is subject to a number of
discrete normative demands. The precepts of academic diligence
require the math problem to be finished, whereas etiquette demands that
the phone be answered before it rings too many times. The babysitter
also clearly has, at the very least, a fiduciary obligation to his or her
employers to check up on the child. Most of us would feel that there is
no real contest amongst these obligations when it comes to determining
which is the most pressing; the babysitter should first look in on the
toddler. But we might find it at least a bit harder to formulate a principle
explaining why this responsibility overrides the others. And if our
hypothetical babysitter succeeds at checking on the infant before
performing the other two tasks, we would surely not fault the babysitter
much if he or she was unable to articulate why he or she made this
decision.
We view the capacity to detect overridingness amongst the various types
of obligations that present themselves to us as a type of skill-knowledge,
something that is possibly aided by, but not necessarily equivalent to, a
belief in any particular theory of morality. It is something more like a
highly context-sensitive type of receptivity to the features most salient to
action in one's present environment.
What I want to suggest is that for many, if not most, narrative artworks,
to appreciate them aesthetically requires the same type of mental act
involved in apprehending the property of overridingness itself,
considered as a general feature that is shared by all genuine moral
obligations, regardless of how they might otherwise differ in their specific
prescriptive content. And the ability to do this reliably is a very general
type of skill or virtue that most, if not all, good art can help to inculcate.
When Burgess expresses admiration for the The History Man because
"no judgment is forced" about the protagonist's moral character, he
surely does not mean that the book completely avoids didacticism, nor
that it adopts a laudably neutral perspective upon the events that it
chronicles.[22] What he commends, rather, is the fact that solving the
work's central puzzle, by figuring out what's truly important about the
shabby treatment Howard Kirk doles out to his family, students, and
colleagues, is not made too straightforward or facile an undertaking for
the reader. For, to the extent that it presents him or her with a genuine
challenge, the reader will develop, at least temporarily, an increased
capacity to distinguish what in human nature is merely attractive from
what is genuinely worthy of emulation.
If the distinctive type of value possessed by ethically significant artworks
is instrumental in the way just described, it should furthermore be
expected to increase in proportion to the difficulty of the problems that
audiences must solve in order to properly appreciate those works. It is in
this specific sense that the thesis I wish to defend about the nature of
aesthetic value deserves to be called agonistic moralism, hereafter AM.
AM provides a neat elucidation of what Eaton might mean by her remark
that the artworks she discusses must somehow address themselves "to
a problem worth solving." For the type of value just described seems to
me to be exactly the distinctive species of merit that is exhibited by
artworks with Humean rough heroes. The psychological tension between
sympathy and revulsion that Eaton describes such narratives as
provoking in their most receptive audiences could not be achieved
unless these works made it simultaneously possible to admire some
features of a rough hero's personality and to sense that the
considerations that have prompted one's esteem are not genuinely
overriding. Fans of The Sopranos or Lolita who find themselves
experiencing a troubling degree of sympathy for Tony or Humbert
haven't necessarily arrived at the level of moral achievement reached by
our hypothetical babysitter and may not have learned any especially
important truths about either the principles of morality or the
idiosyncrasies of human motivation. But they will at least have gotten
some practice at exercising a crucial mental ability that serves as a
prerequisite for both such accomplishments- a type of moral
perceptiveness, to use the idiom favored by contemporary Aristotelians.
This is a considerably more modest claim than the cognitive immoralist's
proposal that works containing rough heroes should be valued for the
psychological knowledge they make available to us about our own
ethical vulnerabilities or the otherwise inscrutable motivations of the
wicked. And it is perfectly compatible with Eaton's proviso that such
works pose a certain "threat and menace" to their audiences. For clearly,
in art just as in life, sometimes failing to solve a puzzle or overcome a
challenge is far worse than never having tried at all. We should also
concede the Kantian point that no type of discriminatory skill (other than
phronesis itself perhaps), however necessary its possession might be to
competent moral deliberation, is so immune from perversion that it could
not be put to ill use.[23] That having been said, it does strike me as a
subtle misrepresentation to suggest that audiences who identify
unreservedly with characters such as Tony Soprano or Milton's Satan,
without any trace of accompanying discomfort with themselves for doing
so, might nonetheless have fully apprehended the aesthetic value of the
works in which these characters appear.
What about the types of artworks that motivate Gaut's retreat to pro tanto
ethicism on the grounds that they could not be purged of unethical
content without also making them less aesthetically admirable? It seems
to me that such works will be singularly useful for inculcating the ability
to detect the overridingness of moral considerations precisely because
of the fact that their ethically dubious characteristics are so difficult to
separate from what gives them their distinctive value. When one has
achieved a deep enough appreciation of the aesthetic merits of works
such as L’Etranger or Lolita, and thereby necessarily finds oneself
unable to imagine them transformed in such a way as to render them
aesthetically undamaged but morally unobjectionable, this will surely do
at least something to increase one's sensitivity to unresolved tensions
and instabilities within his or her own moral sensibility.
The plausibility of the claims just made depends upon the possibility of
drawing a principled distinction in ethics between propositional
knowledge and the knowledge that is embodied in certain sorts of
practical skills. Some philosophers have argued for the intellectualist
hypothesis that knowledge-how, in general, is either reducible to or just
one species of knowledge-that. But I do not think that any of these
arguments undermine the plausibility of my claim that aesthetic value
should (often, at least) be understood as the capacity of artworks to
produce a particular type of skill-knowledge in their audiences. For it
seems to me that the ability to detect overridingness amongst all of one's
various reasons for action is more accurately thought of not as a type of
know-how at all but rather as an instance of what David Wiggins
describes as "knowing to." A person might know how to ride a bicycle
while also knowing to stop riding if his bicycle gets a flat tire. Wiggins
points out that the latter idiom, while perhaps less common in English
than the former, is perfectly grammatical.[24] Knowledge-to does not
seem to be susceptible to the type of analysis of know-how favored by
intellectualists, according to which the latter type of knowledge is
paradigmatically expressed by declarative responses to wh-
questions.[25] But even if the psychological difference between these
two types of states, know-how and knowledge-to, deserves to be
regarded as negligible, they certainly do appear to differ in normative
kind, in the sense that attributing know-how to someone indicates merely
that he or she has the ability to successfully perform some action X,
whereas attributing knowledge-to indicates that he or she also has the
capacity to discern when doing X is optimal relative to any other
available option.
The case for AM could be strengthened considerably if it were possible
to find some empirically independent basis for believing in the distinctive
type of ethical skill-knowledge that I have associated with the
appreciation of ethically significant artworks. Unfortunately, I think that
any attempt to present direct evidence for the existence of this sort of
psychological trait, however apparently well-grounded in the methods of
experimental psychology, would be bound to come across as question-
begging. For in order to treat AM as a testable hypothesis, one would
have to start out not only with some antecedent conditions for when a
person counts as a competent appreciator of suitably serious artworks,
but also with clear criteria for what sorts of behaviors would qualify as
manifestations of the relevant moral skill. Perhaps the first task is not so
difficult. The mere decision to spend one's time consuming art, as
opposed to, say, watching sports or getting drunk, surely counts for
something, and such patterns of consumer behavior are fairly easy to
track. The second task is more problematic, though. Until the
experimentalist has committed to a particular moral theory -Kantianism
or Utilitarianism, say- and thereby decided what sorts of substantive
reasons for action really should be counted as overriding, it would be
impossible to determine whether the artworks under examination really
brought about ethically significant changes in character or attitude.
Recent research by psychologists that has identified a correlation
between the reading of literary fiction and the development of empathy
and theory of mind is certainly encouraging.[26] But it cannot be taken
as providing direct support for AM, since neither species of psychological
trait may be regarded as just self-evidently beneficial to an individual's
moral development.[27]
One species of artworks does provide a more serious challenge to the
universal applicability of AM.[28] Certain narratives that represent an
intriguing subclass within the broader category of tragedy seem
designed to give rise to the conviction in their audiences that, in some
circumstances, there is simply no unambiguously overriding reason to
pursue any determinate course of action. In the first half of Sophocles'
Antigone, when Creon chastises the heroine for disobeying his edict not
to bury her brother, one is left with a much stronger sense of the
inevitability of their mutual destruction than of either party's
unequivocally being in the right. And in Martin Scorsese's 2006 film The
Departed, after a pair of otherwise sympathetic characters decide to
betray the competing organizations they work for (the police force and a
criminal syndicate), power relationships become so convoluted that one
is left radically uncertain whether either had a plausible ethical basis for
choosing between loyalty and duplicity in the first place.
The tragic situations that these works depict seem to be explicable only
in terms of the unavailability of such reasons to the characters in the
narrative. For this reason, I do not think it is plausible to say of these
works that their aesthetic value consists in the inculcation of a skill at
discerning overriding reasons for action.
The extent to which this is a problem for AM will depend upon rather
delicate considerations about the scope and limitations of morality in
general. In spite of certain perennially attractive intuitions to the contrary,
for example, that 'ought' implies 'can,' it seems to me undeniable that
sometimes morally good actions are performed by an agent as the result
of external intervention in that agent's activities or deliberations, and
sometimes morally bad actions are performed by agents for whom no
better option was available. Other philosophers who have defended the
possibility of this type of moral good or ill luck have characterized the
real-life circumstances in which it occurs as being themselves
fundamentally tragic in nature.[29] So this special type of narrative
artwork only qualifies as a genuine counterexample to AM to the extent
that its defenders would also be prepared to deny that the deliberations
of unlucky agents depicted therein have any ethical significance
whatsoever. But such tragic works do also represent a small
embarrassment for the defender of AM, even if he or she does believe in
moral luck, insofar as the ethical knowledge that they convey cannot be
explained in terms of the inculcation of a practical skill but has to do with
the nature of morality itself.
5. A postscript on formalism
AM treats the apprehension of aesthetic value as involving detection of
the property of overridingness that is shared by all truly ethical
obligations,[30] without attempting to specify what any of those
obligations actually are. This sets AM significantly apart from the types of
radical moralism defended by authors such as the Tolstoy of "What is
Art?" and the Plato of the Republic, who derive their views about the
value of art from substantive assumptions about what morality dictates.
AM is closer in spirit to a view that Iris Murdoch defends in The
Sovereignty of Good. Murdoch characterizes art as a means to virtue on
account of its capacity to "enlarge the sensibility of its consumer" and
thereby achieve "a kind of goodness by proxy."[31] She takes this view
to be implicit in Plato's discussion of the nature of beauty in the
Symposium, from which she also derives the suggestion that moral ideas
"are perhaps most clearly seen in the context of the technai."[32] Here
she is referring not only to the technical capabilities of artists but to all
forms of sufficiently rigorous and abstract study, including even
mathematics.
These remarks suggest that there might be an interesting sense in
which a view like AM deserves to be classified as a type of formalism
about aesthetic value. Yet the most influential types of aesthetic
formalism in modern aesthetics are widely regarded as being starkly
incompatible with even the most moderate species of moralism. While I
lack the space to investigate the reasons behind this view in any detail, I
think that this is at best a crude oversimplification.
To consider just one famous example, Clive Bell's characterization of the
aesthetic value of paintings in terms of their significant form, which he
usually associates with physical patterns in the distribution of color and
geometrical composition, doesn't seem to have much to do with the
types of value-claims that aesthetic moralists normally make. But in a
famous remark that addresses the issue directly, he says, "Once we
have judged a thing a work of art, we have judged it ethically of the first
importance, and put it beyond the reach of the moralist." What he means
by distinguishing the ethical from the moral in this way becomes clear in
a much less well-known passage from Art, where Bell remarks that to
classify something as a genuine artwork is "to credit [that] object with
being so direct and powerful a means to good that we need not trouble
ourselves about any other of its possible consequences."[33] This
indicates that, while he might have balked at the sort of overtly
instrumentalist account of aesthetic value implied by AM, his otherwise
infamously elusive notion of aesthetic 'significance' could plausibly be
construed in a way that harmonizes with moralism. I suspect that a
similar treatment might be available of the otherwise rather murky notion
of 'formal purposiveness' that Kant associates with judgments of
beauty.[34]
What is less easy to extract from the work of either of these authors,
though it is hinted at in a few of Kant's remarks about the sublime,[35] is
the idea, central to AM, that the detection of an artwork's value through
the apprehension of its form arises from something like a contest or
some interplay of challenge-and-response between the artwork and its
audience. I hope to have shown how such a view might help to solve
puzzles that arise in the interpretation of some narrative artworks that do
not at first glance seem to provide particularly robust support for
moralism.
To what extent can AM be generalized to other forms or species of art?
Works that are conventionally classified as abstract, absurdist, or (in the
case of music) 'pure,' frequently evoke only the very most ephemeral of
ethical judgments from even their foremost devotees. There certainly
does not seem to be a great deal of similarity between the experience
of, say, listening attentively to a Bruckner symphony or confronting the
spectacle of a Dadaist assemblage and the dawning awareness of an
overriding reason to perform some ethically significant action. Noël
Carroll describes his particular version of moralism as moderate partly
because he thinks it is just obvious that these and similar works "have
no moral dimension" whatsoever.[36]
But such intuitions have been held much less universally at other points
in the history of aesthetics. Consider Schopenhauer's account of the
capacity of all music, pure and otherwise, to induce a state of ethically
beneficent self-transcendence. Or consider Walter Benjamin's
characterization of the type of moral shock effect provoked by Dadaist
paintings and poems as intimating a "sacrifice of market values."[37]
Both of these authors clearly conceive of the types of aesthetic
experiences that such works bring about in both moralistic and agonistic
terms. For Schopenhauer, music challenges the listener to achieve a
profound knowledge of the inner nature of the world that can never be
attained while one's attention is focused on the subordinate expressive
or imitative properties that it always also to some extent possesses.[38]
And for Benjamin, Dadaist art prompts a struggle within its audiences to
resist adopting the default attitude of mere detached contemplation
toward artworks, which he regards as a symptom of "the decline of
middle-class society."[39] Such interpretative strategies might strike
many as forced or excessively ideological but the mere capacity to
prompt them serves as a sign that even the sorts of artworks Carroll
deems beyond the scope of moral assessment can, when placed in the
right environment, serve to challenge, puzzle, or confound us in ways
that might make us into better audiences and better people.
It is a philosophical commonplace that part of what makes aesthetic
experience distinctive is some sort of active engagement with its objects
rather than the type of mere passive receptivity characteristic of ordinary
sense perception. I have argued for the less widely accepted thesis that
what makes many, if not most, aesthetic experiences valuable is the role
that they play in the development of a type of discriminatory skill, a skill
that also happens to be a prerequisite for successful moral deliberation.
The sorts of artworks that Carroll, Eaton, and Gaut appeal to in defense
of 'moderation' are, in fact, better viewed as having just this type of
instrumental value. It is only once we have taken up the challenge
offered by artists as diverse as Milton, James Gandolfini, Vladimir
Nabokov, and Malcolm Bradbury to elevate to consciousness the morally
perilous deliberative tensions their works are designed to provoke that
we may apprehend these works in all of their aesthetic profundity.[40]
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